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In The Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
ARTHUR 0. NAUMAN, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
HAROLD K. BEECHER AND ASSOCI-





STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action for personal injuries sustained 
from a trench cave-in at the construction site of the 
Metropolitan Hall of Justice in Salt Lake City, Utah. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The Trial Court, sitting without a jury, granted 
Judgment in favor of the Plaintiff against the cor-
porate architect based on the architect's negligence 
in failing to stop work on the trench until unsafe · 
conditions were remedied. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent, Arthur Nauman, seeks to have the 
Trial Court's judgment affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
· The Trial Court, as the determiner of facts, hav-
ing heard the evidence and observed the demeanor 
of the witnesses prepared detailed Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law in support of its decision. 
On appeal all the evidence and all reasonable inf,. 
ences fairly to be drawn therefrom must be re 
viewed most favorably to those findings.If there is 
substantial evidence furnishing a reasonable basis 
in support thereof the fudgment must be affirmed. 
Rummell v. Bailey. 7 Utah 2d 137, 320 p. 2d 653 (1958); 
Lake v. Penders. 13 Utah 2d 76, 368 P. 2d 593 (l 962); 
John C. Cutler AsRociation v. D. J. Stores. 3 Utah 2d 
107, 279, P. 2d 700 (1955). Since the Appellant Archi-
tect did not present its Statement of Facts in accord-
ance with the above law, Respondent deems it 
necessary to present the Statement of Facts in full. 
The Appellant, Harold K. Beecher and Associ-
ates, in 1960 entered into separate but similar agree-
ments with Salt Lake County and Salt Lake City to 
provide professional architectural services in con-
nection with the proposed construction of a City-
County complex (T. 520, 521; Pl Ex. 1). Pursuant to 
its contracts wiht the public bodies, the Architect 
agreed to perform architect's professional services 
consisting of the necessary conferences, the prepa-
ration of the working drawings, specifications, the 
drafting of the contracts, and the general administra-
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tion of the construction project (Pl Ex. 1). The Gen-
eral Administration Section of the contract provided 
in part that the Architect was to furnish at his own 
expense u. qualified, on-site inspector during the en-
tire time the constructon work was in progress, 
whose duties were to consist of checking all. shop 
drawings, to determine the quality and acceptance 
o fthe material and'or equipment to be used, and to 
supervise and inspect all phases of the work being 
done. (Pl Ex. I-paragraph 7). 
Thereafter the Architect in accordance with the 
above agreements prepared the contract documents 
for the construction of the Metropolitan Hall of 
Justice (T. 5: Pl Ex. 2). Those contract documents 
consisted of the general contract, the general condi-
tions, the special conditions, the drawings and 
specifications, the instruction to bidders, the notice 
to creditors, the bid proposal, and the bond. All of 
the above documents were part of the contract 
which Salt Lake City, and Salt Lake County entered 
into with Christiansen Brothers, Inc., the general 
contractor (Pl Ex. 2). 
The specifications were prepared into sections 
with the general contract, the general conditions·, 
and the special conditions being expressly made 
applicable to each section of the specifications (P. 
Ex. 2, paragraph 56-A qener.al conditions). The Gen-
eral Contractor under the contract documents was 
required to perform in part as follows: 
a) to promptly obey and follow every order 
or direction given by the architect (paragraph 
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3 of general contract); 
b) to do the work in strict conformity to the 
drawings, specifications and contract docu-
ments (paragraph 11 of general contract); 
c) to close down the work and stop all op-
erations upon wTitten notice from the architect 
that conditions were dangerous (paragraph 12a 
of general contract); 
d) to maintain his work in a clean and safe 
condition during the entire performance of the 
contract (paragraph 15a general contract); 
e) to take all necessary precutions for the 
safety of the public employees on the work and 
to comply with all applicable provisions of Fed-
eral, State and Municipal Safety Laws and 
Building codes to prevent accidents or injury 
to persons on the premises where the work is 
being performed and to erect and maintain all 
neceslOary safeguards for the protection of the 
public and workmen (paragraph lb of the Spe-
cial Conditions Section of the Contract); 
f) to provide adequate sheet piling to safe-
guard life and property when eacth b:-.~"k-o 2: ~ 
to deep or are too steep (Section 2, page 2 of 
the Specifications on Excavations). 
The Construction Contract expressly provided 
that the Architect, as the representative of both the 
City apd County, was in charge of directing super· 
vision. of c:onstrudion (Pl Ex. 2-paragraph 56-A. 
General Conditions). The Architect, Harold K. 
Beecher and Associates, had in part the following 
rights and powers under the contract documents: 
a) The architect was in charge of directing 
supervision of construction (paragraph 56a of 
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;;enrral conditions); 
b) tht architect had the right to inspect and 
reject all work and materials and the manufac-
ture of such materials from the beginning of 
construction until the final completion and ac-
ceptance of the work (paragraph 3 of general 
contract); 
c) the architect had the right to assign such 
assistance ::lS necessary to inspect the materials 
to be furnished and the work to be done under 
the contract to see the same strictly conformed 
to the specifications (paragraph 3a of the gen-
eral contract): 
d) the architect had the right to give orders 
to the Contractor, his superintendent, and Fore-
man, who were required to promptly obey and 
follow (paragraph 3c of the general contract): 
e) the architect had the right to close down 
the work due to circumstances arising during 
the pro~ress of the work which might be con-
strued to be dangerous or that may be caused 
by noncompliance with the specifications, upon 
written notice and the work was to remain 
closed down until further orders were given in 
writing by said architect (paragraph 12a of 
general contract) ; 
f) the architect had the right to direct the 
contractor to suspend, remove, or reconstruct, 
or make good without chaq:;e any work which 
the architect may consider to be· defectively 
executed (paragraph 14 of general contract): 
That as part of this construction project it was 
necessary to first excavate a trench approximately 
900 feet long in order to install a utility tunnel con-
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necting the new boiler room to the old City-County 
complex (T. 523, 771). The corporate architect hired 
Johnathan H. Tucker as its qualified, on-site inspec-
tor and job representative (T. 522, 523). The Presi-
dent of the Corporate Architect was Harold K. 
Beecher who wa_s a licensed architect and a mem-
ber of the American Institute of Architects (T. 534). 
Both Harold K. Beecher and Johnathan H. Tucker 
on behalf of the corporate architect had considerable 
experience with the excavation of deep banks (T. 
962; Pl Ex. 52 Tucker's 1st Deposition-pages 5, 10. 
14). At the time of trial Mr. Tucker was living in 
California and because of his absence both of his 
depositions were admitted into evidence as if Mr. 
Tucker had been present and had testified (T. 601, 
1117; PL Ex. 52, 53). Mr. Harry F. Butcher was the 
project representative for Salt Lake City and Salt 
Lake County. during the course of construction (T. 
525). Mr. Butcher's duties included the job of in-
specting to see if things were done according to 
the plans and specifications called for (T. 538). Wal-
ly Chrfstiansen, the Vice-President of Christiansen 
Brothers Construction, Inc., was the project manager 
on the Metropolitan Hall of Justice project in charge 
of the entire project for the general contractor (T. 
770, 772). 
The excavation for the east-west utility tunnel 
began approximately the first part of September, 
1963, and proceeded westerly across 2nd East over 
to the old City-County Building (T. 538, 539; Pl Ex. 
53 p. 13). The trench was approximately 20 to 23 
feet deep as it proceeded west of 2nd East (T. 541, 
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666) As the excavation and tunnel work proceeded, 
Mr. Harry f. Butcher representing the City Engi-
neer's office and Mr. Johnathan Tucker the qualified 
represenL3tive and on-site inspector for the cor-
porate architect occupied a joint office and worked 
closely together (T. 536; Pl Ex. 53 p. 9). Both Mr. 
Butcher and Mr. Tucker saw the utility tunnel trench 
on mary occasions both prior to and after the acci-
dent (T. 542; Pl Ex. l 5, 20). Mr. Tucker on behalf of 
the arch~tect prepared written daily reports which 
he submit1ed to Harold K. Beecher on behalf of the 
corporate architect (T. 524, Pl Ex. 8). Mr. Tucker and 
Mr. Beecher, both representatives of the architect, 
had almost daily contact and conversations regard-
ing the progress of the work (T. 524). During the 
progress of construction Mr. Harold Beecher, who 
admittedly had considerable experience in excavat-
ing deep banks, visited the construction site several 
times a week, every week (T. 534, 962). 
Mr. Tucker testified that he observed the exca-
vstion of the trench as it progressed every day and 
that a safety line for the normal slope of the trench 
for safety purposes was never established (Pl £x. 52, 
p. 20). The trench was nearly perpendicular except 
for about 3 feet at the top (Pl Ex. 25, P. 20). The 
standard safety slope for trench excavations, ac-
cording to Mr. Tucker as well as the provisions con-
tained in Section 69 of the Utah General Safety Or' 
ders applicable to trenches on that project, should 
be one-foot back on each side for every two feet 
of depth rp1 Ex. 52, p. 13; Pl Ex. 25, Pl Ex. 51). Mr. 
Tucker testified that he complained to Wally Chris-
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tiansen nearly every day concerning the condition 
of the walls of the excavation in the utility tunnel 
trench due to the lack of slope or shoring (Pl Ex. 53 
p. 22, 27). \/\Tally Christiansen told Tucker it would 
cost too much money to haul dirt away and then 
have to back-fill afterwards if they sloped, therefore, 
he wanted to keep the trench to a minimum (Pl Ex. 
52, p. 24, 67; Pl Sx. 53 P. 40). 
In the middle of September of 1963, Mr. Casper 
Nelson, a member of the Utah Industrial Commis-
sion, whc wr:i.s directly in charge of the safety divi-
sion, sent Mr. John Holmes, a state safety inspector, 
down to inspect the entire project because of com-
plaints he had received from one of the inspectors 
on the job (T. 624, 625, 626). On September 16, 1963, 
Mr. John Holmes arrived on the project and ob-
served the east-west utility excavation area to be 
d::i.ngerous in that the walls were vertical and were 
not supported bv any shoring (T. 612, 615). The area 
of the trench where he observed these unsafe con-
ditions was approximately along the sidewalk on 
the west side of Second East (T. 613). Mr. Holmes 
at that time talked to the foreman of Christiansen 
and ordered them to begin shoring the ground and 
to live up to state regulations (T. 613). At trial when 
asked if he had ever seen the shoring that he had 
ordered them to install, Mr. Holmes testified "I didn't 
see it completed." (T. 614). Holmes again inspected 
the tunnel area on September 18, 1963, but Chris-
tiansen Brother's men were not working at that 
time (T. 617). Holmes again inspected the trench 
area on October 4, 1963, but no work was going on 
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in the wGst end cf the trench (T. 619). Mr. Casper 
Nelson t2stified that in the latter part of September 
after Mr. Holmes had made his first few visits he 
personally inspected the trench area and observed 
no shoring at all in the trench (T. 626, 627, 635). 
On September 25, 1963, a meeting was held on 
the proiect involving the subject of general s:i.fetv 
rm +he job. Mr. Beecher and Mr. Tucker both em-
plovees of the c0rporate architect were present as 
well as men representing the contractor and the city 
(T. 554, 5S.5). All of those present with the exception 
of the ge::1erril contractor's representative indicated 
that things were not being done correctly (T. 557). 
Rolf Christiansen in that meeting told Beecher to 
leave him abne and he would build the job IT. 557). 
That same day a letter was sent to Christiansen 
Bros., In~. from Harold K. Beecher on behalf of the 
corporate architect notifying the contractor that it 
h"'d not corrmlied with the requirements of the spe-
cification~ for the Public Safety and Jail Building to 
safeguard life and property and urginq the con-
tractor to correct all unsafe conditions (Pl Ex. 52 P. 
46. 47 and exhibit 8 attached thereto). 
Thereafter on September 27, 1963, Christiansen 
Brothers Incorporated forwarded a written letter to 
the comorate architect acknowledging receint of the 
letter dated September 25, 1963, and denying that 
there existed any abnormal hazardous condition on 
the proiect and asking for more specific information 
as to where the alleged violations existed (Pl Ex. 52 
-exhibit No. 4 attached thereto). Thereafter on Sep-
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temebr 30, 1963, Johnathan Tucker on behalf of the 
architect and Harry Butcher, the project engineer. 
sent a letter to Christiansen Brothers indicating that 
the excavated area for the east-west utility tunnel 
required additional safety measures to comply with 
the City, County, and State requirements (T. 552; Pl 
Ex. 10). 
According to Johnathan H. Tucker, work stopped 
in that area for about two weeks because Christian-
sen Brothers, Inc. wanted to stop there until spring, 
but work was resumed thereafter since Beecher 
wanted +he contractor to continue to the end before 
winter. (Pl Ex. 53 p. 30). Mr. Tucker indicated that dur-
ing the time the job was stopped there were cave-
ms in the trench which could have buried men if 
they had been working in the trench (Pl Ex. 53 p. 
52). According to the Architect's daily inspection 
reports on October 2, 1963, Mr. Joe Ruben, an em-
ployee of the architect, took pictures of the bank 
cave-ins, one of which was at the west section of the 
utility tunnel near the old City Hall (Pl Ex. 8, 34). 
Mr. Tucker's inspection daily report sheet for Oc-
tober 10, 1963, indicated that clean-up work was 
performed at the tunnel (Pl Ex. 8). The October 10. 
1963, daily report sheet prepared by Wally Chris-
tiansen indicates that on that date the contractor 
had a dragline on the east-west utility tunnel proj-
ect and was hauling clay away and cleaning out the 
tunnel that caved in when rain and flood came (Pl 
Ex:. 37). According to the daily report sheets pre-
pcred by Mr. Tucker, the architect's representative. 
excavation work was performed in the east-west 
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tunnel area on October 11, 1963, and October 15, 
1963 (Pl Ex. 8). The daily report dated October 15, 
1963, indicated that Harold K. Beecher visited the 
job on that date and made an inspection of the ex-
cavations w~th Mr. Butcher (Pl Ex. 8). 
On October 16, 1963, Art Nauman, the respond-
ent. was brought on the project for the first time for 
the purpose of finishing the construction of the tun-
nel that had been started west of the Second East 
Road (T. 652). 'Tucker testified that despite com-
plaints made to Wally by him regarding failure to 
comply with safety regulations, the trench on Oc-
tober 16, 1963, was still in an unsafe condition since 
Wally had no shoring west of the end of the tunnel 
(Pl Ex. 52 p. 50). Mr. Nauman had only worked on 
two trench excavations prior to that which were 
only 6 or 7 feet in depth (T. 691). Nauman in his ex-
perience as a carpenter had never worked in such 
a confined area, with the depth and water which 
the utility tunnel excavation had (T. 665). Nauman 
had likewise never supervised or done any labor 
on shoring the walls of an excavation; he had only 
done some shoring against concrete forms (T. 666). 
The trench in that area on October 16, 1963, was 
full of water and mud requiring Mr. Nauman to 
spend much of the day pumping water out (Pl Ex. 53 
p. 58). That morning Mr. Nauman met with Wally 
Christiansen the project manager who told him that 
he had received some complaints about sloping 
from the inspectors which were overly exaggerated 
(T. 679). I.JI/ally told Art Nauman that the sloping was 
sufficient, that he couldn't afford to slope it any 
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more than ii: was already and he would have to rely 
on shoring (T. 679). Wally further told Mr. Nauman 
that he couldn't taper in the area of the trench where 
the light pole existed, since the city wouldn't let 
therri remove it (T. 654). At trial Harry Butcher denied 
the fact that Wally had asked him, or Roy Mcleese, 
the city engineer, or VVoody Walton, or Joe Fenton, 
city employees, for permission to remove the light 
pole (T. 592). Pe stated if they wanted to remove it 
all they had to do was pay for it (T. 592). John Tuck-
er testified he had requested Wally to remove the 
light pole, but Wally refused because he didn't 
want to hire any electricians (Pl Ex. 53 P. 59). Ac-
cording to Tucker it was Wally's responsibility (Pl 
Ex. 53, p. 59). Thereafter Wally took Mr. Nauman 
to find a sevrer leak so it could be repaired. (T. 657). 
Wally also introduced Nauman to the clam shovel 
operator who was told to help Nauman in regard to 
the sewer line leak and to prepare the excavation 
in the trench for gravel which had been ordered for 
that morning (T. 167). The gravel, which y;.:::..s not 
ordered by Mr. Nauman, arrived about 10:00 that 
morning and was to be used as a leveling base for 
the rough floor under the tunnel (T. 659. 660). As 
:tvfr. Nauman was being shown the job by \"!ally 
Christiansen, he noticed two laborers who were 
working in the trench (T. 657). One of the laborers 
was working behind the forms that extended from 
the poured portion of the tunnel (T. 657). Mr. Nau-
man spent the rest of the day pumping water out 
of the excavation, leveling the gravel, finding and 
exposing the sewer line leak, and putting up bar-
ricades around the job (T. 660, 661 ). 
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That on the morning of October 17, 1963, when 
Mr. Nauman arrived on the job and went to the ex-
cavation there were four laborers already in the 
trench (T. 696). Mr. Nauman had set up his surveyors 
level approximately 8 feet from the end of the exi3t-
ing tunnel and was taking grade shots when the 
cave-in occurred just 30 or 45 minutes after he had 
arrived at the excavation (T. 663, 664). At trial the 
Defendant, throngh counsel, stipulated that Mr. Nau-
man received serious, permanent injuries as a re-
sul t of the above accident (T. 649). Mr. Nauman's 
neck wa~ broken rendering him qtiadriplegic. 
Both Johnathan Tucker, representing the archi-
tect, and Harry Butcher were present near the scene 
of the cave-in on the morning of October 17, 1963, 
just minutes prior to the tragedy (T. 561; Pl Ex. p. 67). 
Butcher testified that he saw 3everal men in the 
trench spreading gravel with hand shovels (T. 562). 
When asked if he observed the walls at that time, 
Butcher testified that the walls were like they al-
we._ys wore, straight up and down, except at the top 
where it was sloped a little IT. 563). Butcher testified 
that he noticed a bulge on the south bank approxi-
mately eight to ten feet from the end of the tunnel 
(T. 563). When asked if he and Tucker discussed any-
thing about the bulge, he stated, no (T. 568). Tucker 
testified that just minutes prior to the cave-in he in-
spected the area and observed some loose dirt up 
under the base of the light pole (Pl Ex. 53 p. 59). It 
is important +o note that Joe Ruben made the remark 
to Tucker that he did not consider the conditions 
around the light pole safe (Pl Ex. 53 p. 62). Tucker 
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stated that he agreed with Ruben that it was not 
safe and should be removed (Pl Ex. 53 p. 62). Tucker 
stated that he and Butcher had just turned to go 
back to the field office to hunt for Wally to complain 
about ths- light pole when they were told "A man 
has been b1Jried." (Pl Ex.· 53 p. 63). Tucker testified 
that when he went back to the scene of the cave-in 
he observed that the loose earth that was up by the 
light pole was down in the hole (Pl Ex. 53 p. 65). 
Both Mr. Tucker and Mr. Beecher on behalf of 
the corporate architect at least five times went to-
gether and complained to Wally Christiansen rela-
tive to the hazardous condition of the excavation in 
the east-west tunnel area (Pl Ex. 52 p. 34). Tucker 
testified that he never received any order from Mr. 
Beecher or any other employee of the architect tell-
ing him to stop the work until the hazardous condi-
tions were corrected (Pl Ex. 52 p. 36). Tucker stated 
that if any stop-work orders were issued prior to 
the cave-in, ithat the daily reports would reflect it 
(pl Ex. 52 p. 36). None of the daily reports indicate 
any such order. 
At trial, Nauman testified that the excavation 
was approximately 15 feet wide at the base, 21 feet 
deep, and 20 feet wide at the top (T. 665, 666). At 
Tucker's first deposition, he identified a picture tak-
en Yz hour after the cave-in of the trench where 
Nauman was injured which fairly well represented 
the contours of the trench and the conditions that 
existed on the morning of October 17, 1963, (Pl Ex. 
52 p. 44; and attached exhibit No. 6). A copy of this 
same . picture is attached to the last page of this 
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brief. Joe L. Ulibarri, an eye witness to the cave-in, 
who was just ten feet away at the time it occurred 
testified that the walls were straight up and down 
on the south side (T. 535). Casper Nelson, the Indus-
trial Commissioner, testified he went down on the 
project that day after being informed a man had 
been inj'...lred (T. 629). Mr. Nelson, when asked to 
describe the general conditions, testified that the 
walls were real V8rticle, rather than irregular, and 
that he found no horizontal supports across the ex-
C'='Vation west of the end of the utility tunnel (T. 680, 
681). 
ANSWER TO POINT ONE 
THE RECORD lS FULL OF COMPETENT EVIDENCE 
FROM WHICH THE TRIER OF FACT COULD FIND 
THE ARCHITECT WAS NEGLIGENT. 
The Appellant erroneously contends that this 
is one of those rare causes of action in which liabil-
ity can only be predicated upon expert testimony 
of other architects. Such an argument totally ignores 
the fact that there was competent testimony of other 
architects as well as Appellant's own on-site inspec-
tor, plus the stafe safety inspectors, upon which the 
Court could find the Appellant was negligent. Fur-
thermore, none of the authorities cited by Appellant 
involve the architects liability based on its super-
visory undertaking. Instead, they all relate to an 
architectE: liability based upon defects in plans or 
specifications which obviously would require some 
expert t8stimony from an architect. In this case, 
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however, recovery is based upon the failure of the 
architect who had undertaken for a price to super-
v]se job performance, to see that work was done 
s:i.fely. Under this theory, questions involving safety 
and notice thereof in construction were not matters 
which architects were the only ones competent to 
testify on. 
The Court, in Paxton v. Alameda County, 259 
P. 2d 934 (Ca. App. 1953), recognized this distinc-
tion between an architect's liability based upon de-
fects in plans and specifications and the architect's 
liability in its s11pervisory capacity. In that case suit 
was brought against both the County which was 
constructing the building, and the architect. The 
only allegation of negligence against the architsct 
involved his negligence in preparing the plans and 
specifications. The Trial Court found for the Pla]ntiff 
against both defendants. On appeal, the Court after 
weighing the expert testimony held that the evi-
dence did not sustain the verdict of the jury that the 
architect was negligent in preparing the plans and 
specifications but found against the County under 
the theory that the County was liable because of 
the negligent supervision of its agent, the architect. 
The Court made it quite clear that had the Plaintiff 
added a count against the architect based upon its 
negligent supervision the jury could have found 
the architect was negligent for not making another 
inspection. 
The Appellc.nt agreed with the public bodies to 
furnish at its own expense a "qualified" on-site in-
spector during the entire time the construction work 
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was in progress to supervise and inspect all phases 
of the work being done Pl Ex. 1). Johnathan H. 
Tucker was this "qualified on-site inspector" em-
ployed by the architect. Mr. Tucker's work record 
indicates that he had been general superintendent 
for several large construction companies and had 
been in full charge of heavy construction for a num-
ber of years. That experience included being in 
charge of several excavations. The testimony con-
tained in Mr. Tucker's two depositions, both of 
which were admitted into evidence, standing alone 
is suffident, competent evidence from which the 
trier of hct could conclude the architect was negli-
gent. In support thereof we refer the Court to the 
numerous references to Tucker's testimony con-
tained in Respondent's Statement of Facts, which 
clearly establishes that a dangerous condition did 
exist, that the architect knew of this condition, and 
that the architect took no steps to correct the danger. 
Tucker's testimony indicates that he as the archi-
tect's on-site inspector and job representative 
watched the excavation of the trench as it pro-
gressed every day. According to Tucker, Joe Ruben, 
who was an architect as well as an employee of the 
Appellant, admitted to him prior to the cave-in that 
the area around the light post didn't look safe (Pl 
Ex. 53 p. 62). Tucker also testified that despite the 
fact he had requested Wally to remove it, Wally 
refused because he would have to hire electricians 
(Pl Ex. 53 p. 59). In addition to the above, Tucker 
identified the picture marked exhibit P-6 as one ac-
curately representing the conditions that existed in 
the trench at the time the cave-in occured. (Pl Ex. 52, 
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p. 45 picture No. 6 attached thereto). That picture (a 
copy of which is attached to the last page of this 
brief) clearly indicates that the trench was not sloped 
nor shored in the area where the cave-in occurred. 
Casper Nelson, the Industrial Commissioner in 
charge of the safety division viewed the accident 
scene the day of the cave-in and testified that the 
walls appeared real vertical and were without shor-
ing west of the tunnel. Mr. Nelson, who was also a 
member of the American Society of Safety Engi-
neers, further indicated that the Utah General Safe-
ty Orders for Utah Industries other than mining as 
well as 1he American Standard Safety Code for 
Building Construction were State Safety Codes ap-
plicable +.o that project. According to Mr. Nelson, 
the Americc.n Standard Safety Code is recognized 
as the Bible for safety standards in the building in-
dustry. Both of the above safety codes were express-
ly made a. part of the constructon contract, and both 
required either sloping or shoring (Pl Ex. 2 paragraph 
lb special conditions; Pl Ex. 25, 26, 50). 
It is important to note the American Standard 
Safety Code for Building Construction represents a 
consensus of a number of combined interests groups 
as to the present thinking in the field of safety. The 
American Institute of Architects, the American So-
ciety of Civil Engineers, the National Safety Coun-
cil, and the Associated General Contractors of 
America are but a few of the organizations that 
sponsored this particular safety code. The minimum 
requirements pertaining to excavation and trenches 
contained in that code provided illustrative evi-
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dence cf safety practices or rules generally prevail-
ing in the industry. Failure to comply with these 
generally recognized safe practices in the industry 
was competent evidence for the finder of fact to 
weigh with other factors in determining _the issue 
of negligence. 
Harry Butcher, the project engineer who also 
inspected the job along with Tucker, testified that 
he was in the area with Tucker when the cave-in 
occurred just minutes before and noticed that the 
walls were straight up and down (T. 563). Joe L. Uli-
barri an employee of the contractor who was work-
ing just ten feet from the area when the cave-in oc-
curred likewise testified that the walls were straight 
up and down (T. 535). Edwin M. Schneider, another 
employee of the general contractor, testified that 
just minutes after the cave-in, he went to the scene 
and observed no shoring west of the end of the 
tunnel (T. 605). In addition to that, Mr. Evan Ashby, 
the dragline operator who helped in rescue efforts 
testified that he was· ordered to place his- drag line 
bucket in such a position so that if there were any 
additional cave-ins, the bucket would take their t_m-
pact. IT. 884). 
Harold K. Beecher's testimony indicated that 
Wally Christiansen, the contractor's man in charge, 
had not been cooperative with respect to the safe-
ty on the job (T. 998). We refer the Court to Pl Ex. 
47 wherein Mr. Beecher on behalf of the corporate 
architect admitted, in writing, a few days after the 
cave-in that there had been an extreme laclcof .co-
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operation and belligerent attitude that the contrac-
tor, Christiansen Bros. Incorporated had taken from 
the beginning of construction to October 17, the 
date of the accident at the tunnel cave-in. Mr. Beech-
er, President of the Appellant, took the position at 
trial that the architect's liability in its supervisory 
capacity should be limited to a duty to see that the 
project was con.structed in accordance with the 
plans and specifications and that it should have no 
riqhts or responsibilities with regard to safety on the 
job (T. 1022, 1023). Mr. Beecher further testified that 
he did not think he had authority to stop work if he 
saw an unsafe condition on the job (T. 1021). In ad-
dition to 'that, the Appellant in its answer to Plaintiff's 
second ~"mended complaint expressly denied it un-
dertook to enforce the safety regulations and pro-
cedures for the protection of workmen on that proj-
. ect (T. 221 p. 4). 
One need only review the record to see that 
the Appellant's entire defense at trial was made up 
of interested witnesses, in the form of architects, who 
did not fee] that they should be responsible for 
safety. Of the four architects who testified for the 
Appellant, two were employees of that corporntion 
at the time of the cave-in, and the other two were 
members of the American Institute of Architects who 
had never seen the trench, except from pictures. All 
Eour based their conclusion that the trench was safe 
on the erroneous assumption that the trench was 
properly sloped in compliance with the Utah In-
dustrial Commission Safety Orders. It is basic law 
that the testimony of such experts is worth no more 
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than the reasons they give. In the instant case the 
weight of the evidence established that the walls 
were vertical and not sloped nor shored. The trial 
court was not bound to accept the second-hand un-
supported opinions of those architects who had 
never seen the trench, except by photographs, and 
reject the direct testimony of those witnesses who 
were present and personally observed the conditions 
for themselves as they existed on that project. 
There was plenty of competent evidence in the 
form of testimony, photographs, daily reports, let-
ters, and safety codes from which the trial court 
might clearly find defendant was negligent in foil-
ing to see that the work was carried on in a safe 
manner. 
ANSWER TO POINT TWO 
THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE FROM WHICH 
THE FINDER OF FACTS COULD REASONABLY CON-
CLUDE NAU!\-1AN WAS NOT GUILTY OF CONTRIBU-
TORY NEGLIGENCE. 
The burden of pleading and proving contribu-
tory negligence is upon the defendant and if the 
evidence is such as to permit reasonable minds to 
differ as t2 whether a person is guilty of contributory 
negligence the question is one for the finder of fact. 
The Court in Hindmarsh v. 0. P. ·Skaggs Foodliner, 
21 Utah 2d 413, 446 P. 2d 410 (1968) referred to the 
above principles of judicial review when faced with 
the question whether the Plaintiff was guilty of con-
tributory negligence as a matter of law. In that case 
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the court further indicated that there must be al-
lowed considerable latitude in which the reasoning 
of the fact finder can operate and draw its conclu-
sion even though those conclusions may be dif-
ferent from that which the Court on appeal would 
hc..ve decided. The Appellant, in contending that if 
the excavation was dangerous then Nauman was 
contributory negligent as a matter of law, literally 
ignores such important evidenciary factors as 
whether or not Mr. Nauman knew or should have 
known of the danger, his experience, the fact he 
had only worked in the trench a portion of one day, 
and whether or not Mr. Nauman was warned by 
anyone of the dangerous conditions that existed. 
The mere naked finding that a dangerous con-
dition exists does not constitute sufficient evidence 
to establish contributory negligence without first 
showing that an ordinary reasonable person knew 
or should have known of the danger. See Baker vs. 
Decker. 117 Utah 15, 212 P. 2d 679 (1949) vvr_ere the 
Court indicated that mere knowledge that a walk 
was in a dangerous condition did not constitute evi-
dence to establish contributory negilgence. The 
Court in Rogalski vs. Phillips Petroleum Co .. 3 Utah 
2d 203, 282 P. 2d 304 (1955) similarly indicated that 
one couid not be held guilty of contributory 
negligence as a matter of law, i£ it appeared that he 
had no knowledge of the danger. It is important to 
note that Mr. Nauman when injured was engaged 
in carrying 0ut the orders of Wally Christiansen, the 
project manager. The records show that Mr. Nau-
man had only worked on two jobs which had trench 
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excavations prior to the cave-in (T. 691). Nauman 
further testified that in his experience as a carpenter. 
he had never worked in such confined areas and he 
further noted that he likewise had never supervised 
or done any labor or shoring on the walls of an ex-
cavation (T. 665, 666). Nauman was told by Wally 
Christiansen the first morning at work that the com-
plaints about sloping from the inspectors were over-
ly exaggerated (T. 679). Nauman was told that the 
sloping as it existed was sufficient and that the con-
tractor couldn't afford to slope it anymore than it 
already had been (T. 679). The evidence further in-
dicates that Mr. Nauman during his short exposure 
to the project was required to carry out several dif-
ferent errands for the contractor and obviously was 
not able to concentrate all his time without distrac-
tion on the conditions existing in the trench. Nau-
man spent much of his time finding and exposing 
a sewer line leak, pumping water out of the excava-
tion, leveling gravel, and putting up barricades (T. 
660, 661). According to Nauman's undisputed testi-
mony, he thought the excavation was safe for the 
type of work .he was doing at the time (T. 696). 
The Appellant's contention that Mr. Nauman 
knew this portion of the work had been shut down _ 
because of unsafe conditions and was specifically 
directed to be careful and safe is not supported by 
the evidence. The architect's on-site inspector, 
Johnathan Tucksr, co u 1 d not remember of 
:my stop-work orders being issued because of safe-
ty on tha~ project. (Pl Ex. 52, p. 36). He indicated 
that if any said stop-work orders had been issued, 
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the daily reports would indicate so. The daily re-
ports are absent any indication of a stop-work order. 
Accordinq to the testimony at trial, Nauman was 
unaware that a portion of the work had been shut 
down because the previous foreman had not safe-
ly directed the work (T. 673, 703, 705). All Mr. Nau-
man understood at the time was that there had been 
a lapse of time in regard to the work done on the 
utility tunnel trench. 
Wally Christiansen when asked at trial if he 
said anything to Mr. Nauman about safety or safe-
ty precautions on the job stated in substance and 
effect that he couldn't remember exactly whether 
he did or didn't (T. 801). Christiansen also testified 
that he ci:mldn't recall whether he or Nauman dis-
cussed the subject of shoring when he went into 
the excavation on October 16, 1963 (T. 803). 
The Defendant has without question failed in its 
burden of proof to show that the defects were of 
such an obviously da.ngerous character that Mr. 
Nauman under the circumstances was contributorily 
negligent as a matter of law. We find it difficult to 
see how the appellant on the one hand can argue 
that it as well as the general contractor, and all the 
appellant's witnesses, with all their combined exper-
tise, considered the trench to be safe and on the 
other hand change hats and contend the unwarned, 
unexperienced man who had only worked in that 
trench for a portion of one day knew or should have 
known. The evidence is clear that when Nauman 
was injured, he was engaged in carrying out the 
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orders of his supervisor, Wally Christiansen. When 
you combine 1) +he fact that Mr. Nauman had rela-
tively no experience in excavation work; with 2) 
Nauman's short period of exposure to this job; with, 
3) the fad that Mr. Nauman was not warned of the 
dangers including the fact that continual complaints 
had been made about safety on that particular exca-
vation, together; with, 4) the fact that there had been 
prior cave-ins large enough that men could have be 
been buried. it becomes clear that there was suffi-
cient evidence from which reasonable minds might 
conclude tha.1- Mr. Nauman was not guilty of contrib-
utory negligence. The defendant, who had the bur-
den on this issue contributed nothing by way of 
proof to take the issue of contributory negligence 
out of the realm of fact, for determination as a mat-
ter of law. 
ANSWER TO POINT THREE 
THIS COURT IN THE PREVIOUS APPEAL HAS AL-
READY RULED THAT PLAINTIFPS ACTION WAS 
NOT BARRED BY THE PROVISIONS OF UTAH CODE 
ANN. 35-1-42 (1953 AS AMENDED). 
The Appellant unsuccessfully devoted a total 
of 8 pages in its brief on the first appeal of this case 
to the argument that Mr. Nauman's exclusive remedy 
was workman's compensation. The case of Cook v. 
Peter Kiewit Sons Co., 15 Utah 2d 20, 386 P. 2d 616 
(1963), was relied upon heavily in that appeal just 
as it is being argued here. We are not aware of any 
change in the law regarding workman's compensa-
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tion which requires a different decision on this ap-
peal. We submit that the prior decision, in which 
the Court held that Plaintiff's complaint stated a 
cause of action against the architect, should be bind-
ing here. Nauman v. Beecher 19 Utah 2d 101, 426 
P. 2d 621 (1967). 
Ort page 26 of Appellant's Brief it is argued that 
under Utah Code Ann. S. 35-1-42, (1953 as amended) 
that the right to superivse and control is the only 
element necessary in order to establish an employ-
ment situation. Vv e disagree. The right to supervise 
and control, although important factors in.determin-
ing whether or not an employment situation exists, 
must necessarily have combined with its a showing 
that "such work is a part or process in the trade or 
. . 
business of the employer". The relevant section of 
the above statute referred to by Appellant together 
with that part of the statute which Appellant fails 
to consider reads as follows: 
". . . Where any employer procures any work 
t,o be done-wholly or in part for him by a con-
tractor over whose work he retains supervision 
or control, and such work is a part or process 
in the trade· or bu~iness of the employer, such 
contractor, and all subcontractors under him, 
and all persons employed by any such subcon-
tractors, shall be deemed within the meaning of 
this section, employees of such original em-
ployer. Any person, firm or corporation engaged 
in the performance of work as an independent 
contractor shall be deemed an employer with-
in the meaning of this section. The term "in-
dependent contractor," as herein used, is 
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defined to be any person, association or cor-
pom ti on engaged in the performance of any 
work for another, who, while so engaged, is in-
dependent of the employer in all that pertains 
to the execution of the work, is not subject to 
the rule or control of the employer, is engaged 
only in the performance of a definite job or 
piece of work, and is subordinate to the em-
ployer only in effecting a result in accordance 
with the employer's design." 
This question has been considered by the Utah 
Supreme Court on several occasions. In Anderson 
v. Last Chance Ranch Company. 63 Utah 551, 228 P. 
184, the Court made it quite clear that the general 
business of the employer was a controlling factor 
in determining the nature of employment and the 
right to compensation. In that case the Court denied 
workman's compensation to a carpenter's helper 
who had been employed by the ranch company to 
build a house on the ranch. The reason given was 
that the ranch company was engaged in the farm-
ing business not construction which was merely in-
cidental to said business. In Murray v. Wasatch 
Grading Company. 73 Utah 430, 274 P. 940 (1929), 
the Court again looked to the general business of the 
employer. Plaintiff in that case an employee of 
the railroad company but was injured while help-
ing the defendant contractor whose job it was to 
clear debris from the railroad tracks. On appeal the 
Plaintiffs third party action against the contractor 
was denied. The Court on review, looked to a 
statute almost identical to 35-1-42 and found that 
since the Plaintiff was doing work for the contractor, 
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which work was the business occupation of the con-
tractor, the Plaintiff was therefore an employee of 
the contractor, despite the fact he was also an em-
ployer :of the railroad company. The case of Cook v. 
Peter Kiewit Sons Co., supra, (1957), although not 
specifically addressing itself to 35-1-42 does indicate 
and recognize that lhe work being performed by 
the employee must be a part or process in the trade 
or business of the employer. In that case both the 
Pla~ntiff's employer and the Defendant agreed to 
unite their efforts to complete a tunnel by sharing 
profits and losses. Both were regarded as one em-
ploying unit and the employees of both companies 
were treated as engaged in the same employment. 
The Court based its reasonings on the fact that 1) 
the Defendant had as much control over Plaintiff 
as he did his own immediate employees and be-
cause 2) the work which was being performed by 
the Plaintiff was for the joint venture which work 
included the trade or business of the joint venture. 
The case of Gallegos v. Stringham, 21 Utah 2d 139, 
442 P. 2d 31 (1968), presents the most recent consid-
eration of the statute by the Utah Supreme Court. 
In that case the defendant truck owner wholly 
agreed to furnish the truck including the driver to 
Gibbons & Reed Company in connection with Gib-
bons & Reed's contract to lower the grade of the 
street. The expenses in connection with the use of 
the truck were borne by the Defendant truck owner 
who was paid hourly by Gibbons & Reed for the 
use of the truck. During the course of the job, the 
Pla.intiff, an employee of Gibbons & Reed Company, 
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was injured by the defendant. The Court, in declar-
ing defendant was an employee of Gibbons & Reed, 
gave the following reasons which are certainly 
appropos here: 
"In the instant case, Gibbons & Reed had full . 
control of defendants truck and directed the 
driver, whether it . was Stringham or his em-
ployee. The work done by the Defendant and 
his truck was the very work being performed 
by Gibbons & Reed Company pursuant to its 
contract with Ogden City." 
It is obvious from the above decisions as well 
as from the express language contained in 35-1-42, 
that the mere right to supervise and control without 
first establishing that the work done is a part or 
process in the trade or business of the emproyer 
is not enough to bring one's work within the purview 
of the workman's compensation act. In the instant 
case the public bodies procured worked to be done 
for it by Christiansen Bros., an independant contrac-
tor. Since the work of Christiansen Bros. involved 
the business of construction and was not part or 
process in the trade or business of the public bodies, 
the language regarding same employment found in 
Section 35-1-42 is not applicable. The case of Cook 
v. Peter Kiewitt Sons Co., supra, which Appellant 
relies he~vily on can easily be distinguished. In 
that case, the Plaintiff's employer and the defendant 
were engaged in a joint venture, they were shar-
ing profits and losses, the employees of both em-
ployers were under the control of both employers, 
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and the work being performed by both the Plain-
tiff's employer and defendant as well as their em-
plovees was work which included the trade or busi-
ness of the joint venture. In the instant case, how-
ever, the architect and Christiansen's Bros. were not 
engaged i.n a joint venture, they were not sharing 
profits and losses, the work done by the general 
contractor was not a part or process in the trade or 
business of ether the public bodies or the architect, 
and last but not least the element of control is lack-
ing since the architect had no right to interfere with 
the contractor's execution of the work providing it 
was being carried on in a safe manner. See Nauman 
v. Harold K. Beecher & Associates, supra (1967). 
ANSWER TO POINT FOUR 
SINCE REASONABLE MINDS COULD HONESTLY 
CONCLUDE THAT THE FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCI,USIONS OF LAW ARE SUPPORTED BY THE 
EVIDENCE, THE RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT 
SHOULD BE SUSTAINED. 
The Court in DeVas v. Nobel. 13 Utah 2d 133, 
369 P. 2d 290 (1962), in addressing itself to the ques-
tion whether the Trial Court was obliged to make 
the finding demanded by the defendants, set £orth 
the following principles of review which should be 
applied: 
" ... In order to compel such a finding it is 
necessary that the evidence concerning the fact 
in question be of sufficient quality and sub-
stance to support a finding that it is true, but 
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it must go beyond that and be such that all 
reasonable minds would so conclude." 
Appellant's contention that findings No. 13, 15, 
16, and 18, were not supported by the evidence is 
without merit. In support thereof we .incorporate, by 
reference, the evidence referred to in Respondent's 
Statement of Facts, as well as the Answers to Ap-
pellant's first three points. Since the evidence con-
cerning the facts as presented by Appellant was 
not of such "sufficient quality and substance that" 
all reasonable minds would so conclude", the rul-
ing of the Trial Court should be sustained. 
CONCLUSION 
The evidence, taken in its entirety, leads solely 
to the conclusion that Appellant undertook for a 
price to inspect and supervise all phases of the work 
being done. An aspect of that undertaking involved 
the safety of persons upon the construction site. The 
architect's specifications and contracts included 
safety. For more than two weeks prior to the "cave-
in" the Architect had knowledge that the trench was 
unsafe due to water problems, prior large cave-ins, 
and due to the failure of the contractor to slope or 
shore. Under these circumstances a duty de_volved 
upon the architect to stop work on the project until 
the contractor had properly sloped or shored in such 
a manner as to make the excavation a safe place to 
work. See Nauman v. Harold K. Beecher and Asso-
ciates. supEt; Erhart v. Hammonds, 232 Ark.133, 134 
S.\i\T.2d 869; Miller v. De Witt, 59 Ill. App.2d 38; 208 
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N.E.2d 249; Miller v. DeWitt, (Ill. Sup. Ct.); Paxton v. 
Alameda County, supra. 
The ad terrorem appeal by amicus curiae that 
utter chaos in the construction industry will result 
if architects are held to the standard of due care is 
fanciful. Ii the architects will perform their function 
with due care, as must everyone else under our law, 
there will be less accident liability. We reject the 
faulted logic of amicus that the entire architectural 
industry is on trial here. It might not be an over-
statement to suggest, however, that the modi 
operandi of some of its practitioners are. 
Respectfully submitted 
DONN E. CASSITY 
EUGENE H. DAVIS 
FORD G. SCALLEY 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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